philosophy of mind (en anglais)

Is a scientific approach appropriate for the study of consciousness?

Introduction

For the past ten years, the idea of a science of consciousness has arisen. David Chalmers, one of the most eminent philosopher of mind, considers that “the task of a science of consciousness, as I see it, is to systematically integrate two key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data, or data about behaviour and brain processes, and first-person data, or data about subjective experience” (Chalmers D., 2003). And Chalmers seems confident in the future of such a science of consciousness, a science that could enlighten the mystery of consciousness. Thus, a science of consciousness, at a basic level, means a study of consciousness, both objective and subjective aspects of it, by scientists, with scientific methods and scientific theories.

But we might wonder if a scientific approach is appropriate for the study of consciousness or, if we put this questioning the other way around, if consciousness is a scientific object. Indeed, if science is a specific activity, it is therefore characterized by a specific approach, specific methods, and also specific objects. And thus, we might question the ability of science to explain everything, especially consciousness.

In this paper, we will try to explore the possibility of a science of consciousness in the light of both philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. In this respect, we will firstly present our basic assumptions regarding consciousness and argue that a scientific approach of consciousness supposes (at least in Chalmers’ view) a dualist point of view; then, we will try to characterize science, the specificities of scientific methods, scientific objects and scientific results and see if they are appropriate for a study of consciousness. To conclude, after a brief summary of what we achieved in this paper, we will argue for a non-scientific approach of consciousness.

Materialism and dualism: two alternative views concerning consciousness

In this part of the paper, we will expose the several philosophical views regarding consciousness and argue that a scientific approach of consciousness as Chalmers imagine it supposes a dualist point of view, which is the belief in two kinds of realm.

First, there is this first position toward consciousness: materialism. Materialism is the metaphysical belief that there is only one kind of realm, which is physical world, and that everything that exists is wholly composed of matter. What are the consequences of such a belief on consciousness? There are mainly two materialist positions toward consciousness. The first one is to consider that consciousness is an illusion, that is, according to Susan Blackmore, “not something that does not exist but something that is not the way it seems” (Blackmore, 2005, p.50). If we follow this logic, we seems to be committed to conclude for reductionism, to believe that consciousness is not the way it appears (a subjective experience) but is a set of physical processes, mainly neuronal processes. Therefore, a science of consciousness would be reducible to neuroscience. The second option of materialism is to consider consciousness as functional. According to functionalism, mental states are not to be characterized by their contents nor by the physical processes that produces them, but by the function they perform. Therefore, a science of consciousness would study, what causes mental states (the input of consciousness), the interrelations between mental states, and what mental states cause (the output of consciousness, mainly behaviour and verbal reports) (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996).  

However, materialism in these two applications, reductionism and functionalism does not convince all philosophers. Indeed, to consider consciousness as an illusion or just as a functional system, leads to the avoidance of the difficult problem of subjectivity which is for these philosophers what consciousness is precisely about. So here we will consider that a science of consciousness would be a science linking two kinds of data, objective and subjective; which presupposes dualism.

Dualism is fundamentally the belief that there is two kinds of realm, that physical brain processes do not explain the totality of consciousness. Indeed, it is obvious that materialists have problems to explain the subjectivity of our experiences: it seems hard to take in to account subjectivity if you only study objective physical processes. Such a study of subjectivity seems therefore to require dualism. Here we will present three kinds of dualism: Cartesian dualism, epiphenomenalism and David Chalmers methodological dualism between first person data and third person data.

René Descartes, the “godfather” of philosophy of mind, held a substance dualism. According to him, there are two kinds of realms, material reality and mind, and they differ from each other in substance. Material reality’s substance is physical and extended whereas mind is non-physical and non-extended. Such a “strong dualism” is a bit extreme and is not very spread among modern philosophers. But softer versions of dualism were developed in order to “capture” this famous subjectivity. Thomas H. Huxley, who is considered to be the father of epiphenomenalism, developed this idea that consciousness resulted from physical processes, but was in itself a flow of subjective experiences, or qualia and that it has no “power” on the physical world. Testing Descartes hypothesis that animals are automata with his famous “frog experiment”, he inferred that animals are “conscious automatas”, that is that animals have conscious experiences but these experiences have no causations on material world (Huxley T.H., 1874). And he generalized this conclusion to humans. But if this subjectivity, this qualia exists, such a phenomenal consciousness is not totally reducible to the brain processes that produce it, and therefore subjectivity is to be inquired in itself. Close to this theory, David Chalmers dualism is methodological and therefore closely connected to a science of consciousness. He differentiates first person data from third person data. As we have already seen in the introduction, according to Chalmers, a science of consciousness would have to connect, to correlate or to establish an identity between the two. In his mind, “third-person data (are)- about brain processes, behaviour, environmental interaction, and the like –“ and “first-person data (are) about conscious experience” (Chalmers D., 1999).

We have seen that consciousness is considered by materialist as an illusion or a functional system and therefore a science of consciousness would be reducible to behavioural science and/or neuroscience. But a science that would take into account the subjectivity of the mind would requires a dualist background. Now, we will explore the basic features of science and try to show that a scientific approach of consciousness is hardly appropriate for first person data.

Science: observation, falsification and objectivity

            In this section, we will explore these three basic features of scientific approach developed in Alan .F. Chalmers’ book: What is this thing called science?: A scientific theory is based on observation, has to be falsifiable, and is about objects. We will systematically draw theoretical and practical parallels with consciousness in order to dismiss consciousness as a scientific object.

First, according to the positivist stream in philosophy of science, the basis of science is observation. If we put aside the problems observation encounters as a basis of science, such as illusions, the subjectivity of the observer, it appears that scientific observation has to be specific. Not every observation may be a reliable source of scientific knowledge. According to A. F. Chalmers, scientific observations are active and public (Chalmers A.F., 1999, p.19). In Chalmers’ mind, active observation means that “there are a range of things that are done, many of them automatically and perhaps unconsciously, to establish the validity of a perception” (idem, p.19). Public observation means that this observation “can be checked, criticised and added to by others” (idem, p.20).

We may now wonder if subjective consciousness is: first: observable; second: actively observable; third: publicly observable. First, is consciousness observable? If we follow Descartes view on transparency of the mind, consciousness is transparent to itself that is in a way observable by itself. So we can say that consciousness is observable. Second: Is it actively observable? Here, we are discussing the validity of introspection that is the active inquiry by one into oneself. Farthing, among others, has exposed problems of introspection: it is always retrospection and therefore subject to forgetting and misunderstanding; introspection disturbs or changes the subject of introspection; introspection does not take into account unconscious processes of consciousness; and at last, introspection results has to be translated into a verbal report (we will come back on the problems of verbal reports later in the paper) (Farthing, 1992). So an active observation of consciousness seems to encounter many problems, theoretically and practically speaking. At last, is consciousness publicly observable? It seems hardly the case, one of the basic features of consciousness content being its privacy. Indeed, David Chalmers insists on the privacy of subjective experience: “in the case of consciousness, first-person data concerning subjective experiences are directly available only to the subject having those experiences”, (Chalmers D., 2003). So, if science is characterized by active and public observation, consciousness can hardly be a scientific object of scientific inquiry.

Secondly, science has to be falsifiable. Rejecting positivism, that is that science was based on facts, Karl Popper, one of the most eminent philosophers of science of the 20th century, developed this criterion to differentiate scientific theory from non-scientific theory. A scientific theory is different from non-science in the respect that it can be falsified, that is proved false. Science, in this respect, progresses through trial and error. As a scientist, you build a theory on hypothesis, then you (or another scientist) prove its falsity, so you change your hypothesis and build another theory… One important rule is that you cannot add ad hoc modifications to your theory. An ad hoc modification is a “modification in a theory that has no testable consequences that were not already testable consequences of the unmodified theory” (Chalmers A.F., 1999, p.75). An ad hoc modification takes the shape of exceptions, specificities, and more generally of particularities.

Can we falsify theories about consciousness? Let take the example of a neural correlates of consciousness that would correlates a specific neural activity and a subjective experience. A scientific theory about it would be “if we have this neural activity, it results in this particular conscious state”. If we are to understand conscious state by subjective experience, then consciousness is subjective and therefore particular. Because this subjective experience is particular in itself, theories about consciousness (here a neural correlates of consciousness) are hardly testable, and therefore hardly falsifiable. Scientific theories about consciousness are themselves ad hoc: they try to capture the particularity of subjectivity and thus they cannot be systematized. In this respect, theories about consciousness are not falsifiable, and therefore not scientific.

At last, science is an objective activity. What does objectivity means? It mainly means that science is about objects, that are third person data. Here an etymological analysis is worthy. Indeed, science always takes the shape of a Logos (psychology, sociology, biology…), that is in ancient Greek: reason, logic and verb (or word). The Greek concept of Logos is really important: it implicitly associates verbal data with rational approach (significantly, they are themselves situated in the same brain hemisphere). Therefore science is a rational and verbal activity, and thus is per se the study of objects, of third person data, or of objective parameters of things: psyche or mind for psychology, society for sociology, and body and life for biology. From this objectivity of science come logically the observational basis of science, the public aspect of science and the universality of scientific knowledge.

Is consciousness wholly an object? Psychology provides a good example. Psychology is the study of the psyche or mind through behaviour and/or verbal reports. Behaviour and verbal reports are objects. If we follow David Chalmers, behaviour is part of third person data. Verbal report is itself a logos, that is verbal and thus rational and objective. Therefore, psychology is the study of objective aspects (of the outputs) of consciousness. But, as we have seen above, a science of consciousness that would connect first person data (subjectivity) and third person data (objects) presupposes a dualist belief in subjectivity. So science of consciousness would be based on a paradox or even on oxymoron: a science of consciousness would be (partly) the study of the objective parameters of subjectivity!

Conclusion: 

            We have seen in this paper that a science of consciousness that would “connect” objective data and subjective data, as David Chalmers conceives it, requires the dualist belief in subjectivity of experience, or qualia. We also have seen that science is per se unable to treat subjectivity. So a science of consciousness, in a dualist point of view would be impossible.

            But in order to avoid a nihilist conclusion regarding study of consciousness, we can present two alternatives. The first one is materialism and the acceptance of the inability to treat subjectivity, either by denying its existence (reductionism) or by limiting our study to the objective parameters of consciousness (neuroscience and psychology).

The second option is to build a “discipline of subjectivity”. If we follow the line of thought of this paper, this discipline has to be: based on private, passive observation, non-verbal and non-rational approach, and ad hoc or particular in itself. It seems to me that philosophy can fit these requirements (if we accept this particular conception of philosophy).  

Bibliography and sources:

• Blackmore, Susan (2005), Consciousness: a very short introduction, Oxford Univerity Press, 146 p. 
• Braddon-Mitchell, D and Jackson, F (1996), Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
• Chalmers, Alan F. (1999), What Is This Thing Called Science?, 3^rd edition, Open University Press, Buckingham, 266p.
• Chalmers, David (1999), First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness
• Chalmers, David (2003), How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness
• Farthing, G.W. (1992), The Psychology Of Consciousness, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall
• Huxley, T. (1874), On The Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, In Vesey, G.N.A (1964) Body and Mind, London , George Allen and Unwin Ltd.