philog: philosophie sophiste

Introduction

Depression seems, in appearance at least, to be caused only by the environment. Indeed, the most acknowledged causes of depression are a difficult childhood as a long run cause and traumatic events as starting causes.  Thus, depression would only be a specific reaction to a particular environment. The fact that we acknowledge nurture as the only determining factor of depression as a human behaviour as great consequences: depression is not really considered as a disease, but more as a general feeling (feeling depressed), or the belief that anyone is, in theory, equally vulnerable in front of depression.

However, some data are hardly explainable with an only nurtural model of causes. For instance, an only nurtural etiological model of depression can not explain the fact that the heredity rate of depression is higher for women than for men.  Therefore, we ought to introduce and argue for Nature especially genes as a cause of depression. In this paper, we will introduce, analyse and evaluate the importance of Nature as a cause of depression, thus denying Nurture the status of the sole and most important factor in determining depression. 

In this respect, we will provide the reader with a twin experiment that proves the influence of genes in depression. This twin experiment will introduce Nature as a cause of depression. Then, in a deepened analysis of symptoms and chemistry of depression, we will explain how genes contribute to depression. Thus, the role of Nature in depression will be précised and analysed. At last, in confronting natural causes and nurtural causes related to depression, we will propose a model of causation that includes both Nature and Nurture but that shows the Nature’s path in causes of depression, worthily introducing the ideas of genetic vulnerability and of a nurtural expression of Nature. To conclude, we will summarise what have been argued in this paper, and develop the contribution of the work achieved to the eternal debate Nature VS Nurture.

Twin studies: the introduction of Nature in Depression causes

In this first part, we will introduce Nature as a cause of depression. Therefore, we need an experimental setup that could test and evaluate separately the role Nature and Nurture plays in depression. In this respect twin studies are the perfect experiment to evaluate the part Nature and Nurture take in depression starting process. Indeed, in two twins, either if they are monozygotic twins (who has exactly the same genetic makeup), or dizygotic twins (who shares half their genes), who have shared an environment (raised in the same family), or who have not shared any environment (raised separately), the analysis and the comparison of similarity between two siblings lead to an evaluation of the role Nature and Nurture plays in the development of depression.

Thus, we need three groups. The group 1 is monozygotic twins that have shared the same environment. The group 2 is monozygotic twins that have not shared the same environment. The group 3 is dizygotic twins that have shared the environment. In comparing the similarity in a pair of twin from one group to the similarity in a pair of twins of another group, we can state whether Nature or Nurture play a role and eventually evaluate which of them is more important.

According to the ISMHO (the International Society for Mental Health Online), the similarity rate concerning depression is 76% for the group 1; 67 % for the group 2; 19% for the group 3[1]. The results are presented in the table below.

In analysing and comparing the similarity rates between group 1 and group 3, we test the influence of Nature through genes in the causes of depression. Indeed, monozygotic twins share all their genes, whereas dizygotic twins share only half their genes, and twin pairs of Group 1 and 3 have shared the same (familial) environment. Firstly, if the similarity rate is the same for both groups, it means that genes do not play any role in depression. Secondly, if the similarity rate is greater for group 1 than for group 3, it means that Nature plays a role in depression. Moreover, the greater the difference is between Group 1 and Group 3, the greater the role of Nature is, compared to the role of Nurture. Here, the similarity (in depression) rate for Group 1 (monozygotic twins + same environment) is 76%, whereas the similarity rate for group 3 (dizygotic twins + same environment) is 19%. We first see that these rates are different, and that the similarity rate is far greater for group 1 than for group 3. Therefore, it means that Nature (or genes) plays a great role in depression. We also see that the difference in similarity rates (between group 1 and 3) is 57.

In analysing and comparing the similarity rates between group 1 and group 2, we test the influence of nurture through the familial environment in the causes of depression. Indeed, we compare monozygotic twins that have been raised in the same environment to monozygotic twins that have not been raised in the same environment. Firstly, if the rate is the same, it means that nurture does not play any role in depression. Secondly, the greater the difference between rates of Group 1 and group 2 is, the greater nurture’s role is, compared to the role of nurture. Here, the similarity rate (in depression) for group 1 (monozygotic twins + same environment) is 76%, whereas the similarity rate for group 2 (monozygotic twins + different environment) is 67%. We first see that these rates are different, which means that nurture plays a role as well. But we also see that the difference between similarity rates (between group 1 and 2) is 8.

In comparing the differences between similarity rates of Group 1 and 3 (same genes), to the difference between similarity rates of group 1 and 2 (same environment), we see that the difference in similarity rates is much greater for group 1 and 3 than for group 1 and 2. It could mean that nature plays a greater role than nurture in determining depression.

This twin experiment shows that nature plays a role in depression, and that this role could be even greater than nurture’s role. But it also provides lot of additional information that can only be explained through a deepening of genetic and chemical mechanisms in depression determination. Two main facts are striking. The first fact is that the similarity rate between twins is greater for female twins than for male twins. The second fact that the similarity rates decrease with the precision of the definition of depression: the more symptoms you include in your definition, the less similar twins are[2]. These facts can hardly be explained by an only nurtural system of cause.      

We have seen that Nature play a great role in determining depression. But now in deepening our knowledge about chemistry and genetics of depression, we will see in details the contribution of genes in depression.

Chemistry and Genetics of depression

In this second part, we will deepen our knowledge about chemistry and genetics of depression, in order to be able to explain the data we have obtained in the first part. In this respect, we will adopt an etiological model but only for natural causes. Therefore we will start with a quick overview of the symptoms of depression; then we will see that these symptoms correspond to a specific brain activity and especially chemically. At last, we will go to the genetic level, and explore how genes could be responsible for a vulnerability to depression.

First, we have to explain more precisely what depression is. Depression is characterized by numerous symptoms. These symptoms are mood disorder (overall sadness, instability in mood, excitation, or breakdown), sleep disorder (insomnia or hypersomnia), eager disorder (bulimia, or anorexia), sexual disorder…  The presence and intensity of these disorders differ from one kind of depression to another and from one person to another.

            On a physiological level, these disorders correspond on to a specific and complex chemical activity of the brain. This chemical activity consists in a deregulation of interneuronal communication. This communication is made via neurotransmitters and neuroreceptors. Depression is on a chemical level a deregulation of this communication between neurons. However, not all neurochemicals are involved in depression. Indeed, it seems that depression is a deregulation of specific neurochemicals that are responsible for mood, for sleep, for eager, for stress… Three main chemicals have been identified as greatly linked to mood: norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. Here we will analyse only the case of serotonin, but the functioning is identical for all neurochemicals.

Serotonin is a neurochemical that produces a partial inhibition of the nervous system, thus having the function of calming, and giving the impression of contentment and satiety. A disorder in serotonin regulation is partly responsible of depressive behaviour: indeed, depression is especially characterized by difficulties in staying calm, and by the feeling of absence of contentment and satiety.

            But what is important here are the mechanisms that cause these chemical deregulations. Is it nature? Is it Nurture? Both of them?  We know that environment, for example traumatic events, causes a specific chemical activity that creates emotions, for example stress, anxiety or awareness. However, these environmental events create the chemical activity, not the chemical deregulation. It is important to understand that depression is not a set of normal emotions like stress, anxiety or sadness, but rather a deregulation of these emotions. Therefore, if the environment causes emotions but not the regulation of emotions, we have to suppose that this regulation of emotions has a genetic origin. Thus, we have to go to the genetic level, taking the example of serotonin, in order to show that genes are responsible for regulation or deregulation of the emotional/neurochemical system.   

            Serotonin is a type of neurochemical. In this category, there are serotonin neurotransporters and serotonin neuroreceptors. The gene that codes for serotonin neuro transporters exists in two versions: the short version and the long version of it. This fact, together with the fact that chromosomes works in pair allows one to consider three possible genotypes: either [long version – long version], or [long version – short version], or [short version – short version]. The phenotype is the expression of the genotype, that is to say that the physical characteristic that results from the genotype through genetic mechanisms. Here, the phenotypes are clear. According to a study led by Dr. Avshalom Caspi and Dr. Terrie Moffitt, 33% of the persons that have genotypes [short-short] or [short-long] lipped into depression facing traumatic events, whereas that number is only 17% for the persons that have genotype [long – long][3]. These results show that serotonin genes are partly responsible for the development of a deregulation of the emotional / neurochemical system.

            One problem of genetics is to explain the variety of behaviour. Indeed, the reduced possibilities of genotypes as well as those of the phenotypes, offer a poor explanation of this variety. However we must not forget that behaviour is a complex activity, and therefore it involves lot of elements, and therefore a lot of genes. It is through the mechanism of genetic combination that a unique and complex behaviour is created. In the depression case, the number of 19 genetic regions has been proposed recently by Dr. George Zubenko[4]. It would then make a lot of varieties of symptoms and diversity in intensity and duration of these symptoms.

            Moreover, with this genetic model we can explain why the heredity rate for women is greater than the heredity for men. Indeed, it seems to indicate that one of the genes responsible for a vulnerability to depression is on the chromosome X which only women have in pair. 

We have seen that depression symptoms correspond to a deregulation of the neurochemical system determined by genetic origins. We have also seen that with genetic combination, the natural model is able to explain variety of depressive behaviour. But, some supporter of the nurture cause could still critic the natural model, since environmental elements such as a difficult childhood or traumatic events cause depression. Therefore, we need to precise the role of these nurtural causes and see how nature can meddle in nurture, express itself in nurture.

Etiological model of depression: Nature and Nature in Nurture

            In this part of the paper, using the data we gathered so far, we will propose an etiological model, an overview of causation in depression, Thus, we will precise the role of Nature in causes of depression, and develop further the concept of genetic vulnerability. This etiological system will allow one to consider and to define the Nature’s path in causes of depression.

First, we ought to classify causes. The first distinction is to be made between causes of depression, and causes of vulnerability to depression. Indeed, genes are not directly responsible for depression otherwise depression would be an automatic expression of genes. Indeed, it is not the case since the statistics we used above clearly shows that genes code for a vulnerability to depression (especially the fact that monozygotic twins have not 100% concordance concerning depression). This concept of vulnerability is to be developed because it is indispensable in understanding the role nature can have in human behaviour. Indeed, if genes code for vulnerability to depression, or more generally for preferences, genes are somewhere, somehow responsible for human behaviour. Then, the environment would only have the role of developing and precising these genetic preferences. Therefore, concerning depression, some causes are responsible for vulnerability to depression, whereas other causes are starting causes of depression. For causes of vulnerability, we ought to consider genes and difficult childhood. The starting causes, causes that are directly responsible for depression, are mainly traumatic events.

The second distinction is of course the separation between Natural causes and nurtural causes. In the case of depression, the natural causes are as we have already seen, genes, but we ought to differentiate between one’s genes and one’s parent’s genes, one’s parent’s genes being responsible for one’s genes. The nurtural causes of depression can be numerous but we can group them in two elements: a difficult childhood (death of one the parents, one depressive parent…) and traumatic events (divorce, difficult job situation, illness…). In appearances, this distinction between Nature and Nurture may seem clear and simple. However, it is interesting to see how they combine each other and how natural causes may be found into Nurture.

The first nurtural expression of nature is through childhood. Indeed, the difficulty of childhood is often to be found in relationship between the child and the parents. We already know that one’s genes are totally determined through genetic mechanisms by one’s parents’ genes. But parents’ genes can also have a great influence on a person childhood. Indeed, the more vulnerable to depression one is, the more likely his parents are to be also vulnerable to depression. And one of the main causes of a difficult childhood is a depressed parent, or the suicide of one of the parents, or separation of the two parents (that can occur when one of the parent is depressed, or that can cause depression of at least one of the parents). Therefore, to say that Childhood is purely nurtural can hardly be strongly backed.

Secondly, Nature also draws its path in depression through circular causation. Indeed, depression causes a modification in cognition, in one’s perception of the environment. The fact that cognition is modified by depression is really important: it allows one to consider that traumatic events are not traumatic as such, but that they are perceived as traumatic, especially when one is already depressed. Circular causation thus plays a role of deepener of depression. But if nature is, through vulnerability, one of the causes of depression, therefore it also contributes to this particular cognition that made an event to be perceived as traumatic. Therefore, we ought to consider the path Nature draws in causes of depression. Even what was considered as pure nurtural causes (Difficult Childhood and traumatic events) can have a natural origin.

This etiological model is presented in the scheme below: 

We see that depression requires vulnerability and traumatic events to be started. We also see that Nature, through the parent’s genes contribution to a difficult Childhood, or through circular causation, can be found in every cause of depression. We also can infer that the limit between a depressive person (a person who has a genetic vulnerability to depression) and a non-depressive person cannot be straightforwardly established. Some persons will not be vulnerable to depression and therefore have no symptoms of it, even if they live traumatic events, or had a difficult childhood. Others will be only slightly vulnerable to depression, and have no symptoms because the environment did not start it. Others will have only few symptoms whereas some will have the whole set. But in each way, nature draws a path, a reduction of the infinite environmental possibilities to a very few set of possibilities in behavioural response.

Conclusion: Depression, a natural characteristic of human behaviour

In introducing nature as a cause with a twin experiment, in precising the role played by genes in determining vulnerability to depression, and at last in proposing an etiological model of depression, this paper lead one to consider the great role played by Nature in depression. Indeed, Nature through genes not only plays a role in depression, but it plays a major role, determining through genetic mechanism a genetic vulnerability to depression, and resulting through genes combination into a lot of variety of depression. Moreover, as we have seen before, Nature also expresses itself through Nurture, either in determining partly the childhood you had, through your parents genes, or through the process of circular causation that deepen depression. In this respect, this paper contributes to the cause of Nature in the eternal Nature VS Nurture in showing that genes draws a behavioural path that even Nurture cannot change. Then nurture would only determine the temporality of behaviour, but always in that famous natural path.

To analyse photography, we ought to consider that a photograph is not a pure analogon of reality. Indeed, photography carries a message, an interpretation of reality through connotations. Every picture has some connoted elements that load the image with meaning and that are of diverse nature, from the choice of the moment and of the perspective made by the photographer, to the adding of superposed texts. Thus, an analysis of a newspaper picture ought to try to make objective the elements that load meaning into a picture. The picture I have chosen to analyse is a picture of Jacques Chirac from the French newspaper Libération, dated of the 5^th of May 2006.  In order to analyse this picture, I will firstly analyse the image alone, apart from the superposed texts. I will concentrate my analysis on connoted elements, such as Chirac’s pose and the background objects, and try to show the implicit connotations and the symbolism of the picture. I will also try to emphasize the necessity of a code, mainly based for this picture on the knowledge of the main events and evolutions of French politics. Then, I will analyse the image together with the texts, as well as the syntax that connects them.

As Roland Barthes relevantly notices, it is impossible to describe the denoted message of a picture without adding a connotation, an interpretative message to it. However, it is possible to describe the picture, in paying attention not to add too much subjective interpretation to the description. Thus, in the picture of Liberation, we see in the foreground a man of an advanced age in a black suit, and in the background, which is fuzzy, some red curtains, half opened to a closed window. The denoted message in this picture is not really rich, no real astonishing information being carried by the picture itself. We might wonder if the fact that the denoted content of the picture is poor, that there is not much to see or feel in this picture, makes this picture more propitious to the adding of connotations both in the emission and the reception processes. Perhaps we can infer that in the sender (photographer and newspaper) mind, the denoted message of this picture is less important that the connotations we can add to it. And indeed, this picture is really propitious to add connotations to.

Regarding connotations, it is really hard to make the distinction between the intentional connotations, those added intentionally by the sender, and the interpretative connotations, those added by the addressees. Following is that a photography analysis can hardly be totally objective, being partly (or totally?) based on the analyser subjective interpretation. However, once we have recognize this fact, we can go further in the analysis, justifying the subjective interpretations in explaining how the analyser’s mind, his code, his background knowledge, lead him to this interpretation (in this case I will explain parts of the code I have as a French concerning French politics).

First, we ought to know that the man on the picture is Jacques Chirac, the French President. It might seem obvious to French people, or even to European people, but what about those who have no knowledge of French or European Politics? Even, for this simple fact, the interpretation of the picture supposes a minimum code: the knowledge of Jacques Chirac’s face and of the fact that he is the French President.

Apart from this first remark about a necessary code, the first connotation that strikes the observer of this picture is Chirac’s pose. Indeed, the picture is focused on him and shows him alone, looking down, with a particular face expression. From the fact that this picture is in the front page, we might infer that a particular attention was made in the choice of the picture. Therefore, every detail is to be considered as important, chosen by the sender to transmit a striking message. First, Chirac is shown alone. This loneliness in the picture may be connoted as a political isolation. We all know that in politics, isolation is never a good thing. Second, Chirac is shown looking down. Glance is often symbolic. For example,  a forward glance may mean a prospective mind, someone who is interested in the future. In philosophy, it is important as well: we might recall this anecdote of the philosopher Thales from Milet falling into a hole because he was watching the sky, a glance that symbolizes an attention to the Ideas. What does Chirac’s glance to the ground could mean, here? First looking down is a glance at oneself. When you look down, you see your own body. The body is the only thing that does not change in your environment: wherever you are and whatever the environment that is around you, there is only one constant in your outlook of reality: it is your body. Then, looking down is symbolic: it could mean that you do not pay attention to the environment around you, that you rather look at yourself. The reasons of such a glance may be diverse: you pay more attention to you than to your environment, or you are lost and/or scared (then the only constant landmark you have is your body), or else. Whatever could be the precise meaning of this symbol, in politics, symbols are used to characterise attitudes. For this specific symbolic glance, it seems to mean an introspective attitude; it gives (to me) the impression that Chirac is a bit lost, that he lacks self-confidence and control over the environment, over what happens around him. Third, this overall impression is emphasized by Chirac’s face expression. Indeed, his mouth’s shape is like a reversed smile (the sides of the mouth are lower than its centre). Thus it does not give the impression of a confident, dynamic man, but rather the opposite.

The second connoted element of this picture is the background. We see in the background red curtains, maybe velvet-made. I do not know if it is everywhere the same, but this kind of curtains in France is often used in luxurious historical places such as The Louvres (which is the former French king place), or the château de Versailles (also a French king place). These luxurious red curtains may symbolize the Elysée, the French president house, in the continuity of French kings castles: luxury and “Grandeur” (greatness) linked to political power. Besides, we can argue for another interesting interpretation to the red curtain. Red curtains are used in theatres to open or to close a play. We can hardly see the movement on a picture, but if we assume a symbolic movement, these curtains can either be closing or opening. We will see that the added-texts, in loading the picture with meaning, favour the “closing” interpretation of the curtains, thus symbolizing the end of Jacques Chirac reign at the Elysée.

There is some text superposed to this picture. The fact that it is superposed makes the whole set picture-text a same message, with a quite complex but unified syntax. Indeed, the picture is not an illustration of the text, and the text is not a description of the picture. As a matter of fact, they appeal to each other, they work together. The picture can hardly be understood without the text, and the text can hardly be understood without the picture. Through connotations and contextualization, the text literally loads the picture with meaning as well as the picture does it with the text. There are on this picture four text zones. These texts have different size, and police, and are all closely connected to the picture, but in different ways.

The first zone is the logo (the name) of the newspaper: “Libération”. According to Barthes, the name of the newspaper influences the reading of the image. And indeed, in this picture it does. The fact that it is superposed to the picture makes it directly included in the connotations of the picture. It sounds like a word from the Revolution vocabulary. It symbolizes what was common to the revolutionaries of 1789 and 1848, as well as to the resistance of the Second World War. In , it is a real federator message. Here it looks like an appeal against Jacques Chirac. Moreover, the newspaper is politically oriented to the left, whereas Chirac is from the right wing (but in order to be able to interpret this, you have to know that Libération is a left-centred paper).

The second text zone is the bigger text, and can be interpreted as the title of the picture. It is just one word: “Interminable”, which has a double meaning in French: endless, or impossible to finish. French people often use the word “interminable” when a movie or a play is too long and becomes boring, when they wait with impatience the fall of the red curtain on the stage… Chirac has been greatly criticized for the length of his presidency (he has been president since 1995). Moreover, he is widely judged as a mediocre president, making lot of great mistakes, such as the nuclear essays in the Pacific, the assembly dissolution in 1998, or more recently the suburbs riot, the CPE long-run strike, and the current Clearstream affair, a high level scandal of corruption. The pose of Chirac together with this huge “Interminable”, laying here as a judging sentence, makes the impression that Chirac feels it himself as endless and impossible to finish.  So, “Interminable” seems to apply perfectly as a title for the picture, (and maybe also for the reality?).

The two last text zones are contextualising the message in time and space. They are closely connected to the picture, giving both respectively the symbolic and the real context of the picture. Indeed, the first one, “Alors que Jacques Chirac entame sa dernière année à l’Elysée, l’affaire Clearstream éclabousse encore un peu sa fin de règne“ (which means “while Jacques Chirac begins his last year at the Elysée, the Clearstream affair is damaging a bit more his reign end”), is giving the symbolic context of the picture. It makes reference to the Elysée, which is the symbol for French presidency, and there is also an ironical reference to monarchy, with “end of reign”, affirming a long-waited end to this “interminable” show (significantly, the use of the red curtain symbol implicitly follows Neil Post in drawing a parallel between politics and show business). The second one is giving the “real” context of the picture that is date and place: “Le 5 janvier 2005, à l’Elysée”. It is rather functional and not symbolic at all. The size and the place of these texts are rather different. If we assume that a bigger size means a bigger importance, then the “symbolic context” is emphasized compared to the “functional context”. Indeed, the first one is in a medium sized police, quite nice and easy to read, whereas the second one is in a very small police, so small that it is hard to read. But despites their apparent opposition, the two zone texts are closely connected to each other. Indeed, the picture was taken more than one year before it was used, and the Elysée is evoked in both texts as the place (both symbolic and real) of the events. It gives the feeling that nothing has changed in one year and few months and that the situation has not evolved with time. Thus, it creates a vertiginous impression of immobility (we ought to say that “immobilisme” is the French politics fear, and that it has caused the fall of the 4th Republic in 1958). It can be interpreted as an implicit reference and criticism to the institutions of the 5^th Republic. Indeed, the 5^th Republic institutions are currently criticized for the “immobilisme” the presidential regime is leading to.

As a conclusion, I would like to say that this picture was perfect to analyse. It allows one to consider the boundary between the connotations the sender put in it and those put by the addressee, and finally to conclude that it does not really matter whether or not a connotation was intentionally meant. Its final result, a united medium gives the addressees a great message, both implicit (the connoted picture and the place, the size and the police of the text zones, as well as the syntax of the whole message) and explicit (the meaning of the words). The symbolic part of the picture (the red curtain, the “Libération” as a revolutionary appeal, the “interminable”) is really rich and coherent. And even if the picture itself is not a work of art, I could not deny a certain aestheticism of the whole medium, through a complex but interesting syntax, a rich symbolism and an interpretative work with matter and time.

From Plato and the analysis of the influence of writing to Marshall McLuhan with the systemization of an analysis of media, philosophers have always had a great interest in media (even if the use of the word media is itself very recent), and their relationship to culture. Two main positions about a definition of media have been developed. Here, we will quickly present these two philosophical positions about a definition of media, illustrate with examples and try to explain their consequences on media studies.

The first important position upon media is a communication-centered approach. Indeed, for many philosophers, we speak about media as tools allowing communication. In this respect, media would be a “mean of communication” (Briggs and Burke, p.1). Communication, as an etymological analysis seems to imply, is what makes something common in a specific context. Thus, four characteristics seem worthy to focus on in this conception of media as a tool of communication.

First, this focus on communication in media studies implies an interest for the content. It is to be identified with the “what” of mediation. (Briggs and Burke, p.4). In this view, what is important here is the message: whether media carry information, entertainment, fiction, philosophy, or laws is important in media studies. For instance, the fact that the first printed book was the Bible is fundamental for the supporters of this conception of media. Or, as Briggs and Burke show (p.3), the persistence of the theme of a flying superman, whether it is found in nowadays comics, or in Jacopo Tintoretto’s St Mark rescuing a slave shows that the message has a great importance for the media.

Second, in this communication-centered approach of the media, the protagonists of such a communication that is the sender and the audience are also important. It corresponds to the “who” and the “whom” of mediation. For example, we know that in Plato writings, there were a difference between esoteric texts, that is texts which were designed for the little circle of initiated disciples of the Academia, and exoteric texts, that were texts designed for a larger audience. We might infer that this difference was present in Plato intentions, in his manner of writing, the words he used, as well as in the comprehension of his readers. Thus, the fact that a media is designed by a specific sender for a specific audience has certainly a great importance in media.

The third characteristic of media in a communication-centered approach is technology that is the proper mean that carries the content from the sender to the audience. It is to be identified with the “how” of mediation. For instance, the “communication revolution” of the past 30 years, constituted by innovations in television, telephone and networked-computer technologies, has had great influence on our ways of communicating such as “the death of the distance” that is the irrelevance of the distance between the sender and the audience (Bucy, p.3-7).

The fourth and last characteristic of media in a communication-centered approach is the context in which communication is performed. It correspond to the “Where” and “When” of mediation. Indeed, it implies that depending on the context, whether it is historical, cultural, economical or political context, media are not used in the same way, or for the same aims. For instance, during the Second World War, radio has been used for propaganda in , whereas in it has been used for resistance and coded communication between and .

To sum up, the communication-centered approach of the media focus on the content, the protagonists, the technology and the context. Therefore, this conception of media leads to consider every mean of communication as a media: bodily gestures, speech, painting, writing, printing, telegraph, telephone, television, the internet… Moreover, it emphasizes the influence of culture on media.

But some authors, starting with Marshall McLuhan, consider that on the contrary the influence of media on culture has a greater importance, and that media are not just mean of communication but rather culture determinations. Three basic features of this conception of media can be summarized in three catch sentences: “the medium as an extension of the man” (McLuhan, p.4), “the medium is the message” (McLuhan, p.7), and “the medium is the metaphor” (Postman, p.3).

Firstly, according to Marshall McLuhan, a medium is an extension of the man. Indeed, from the use of stone as more effective hands to the use of phone as more effective ears, men have always used things to increase their power, their control, their grasping of the world. Therefore, McLuhan considers everything that extends our “mechanical body” (tools, clothes, bike, car…), our sense perceptions (eyes-glasses, telephone, television…), and our “electrical body” that is consciousness (information technologies: speech, writing, the internet, television, radio…) as media. This conception of media is really striking. Indeed, who could have thought of a stone as a medium?

Secondly, according to McLuhan, the “medium is the message”. In fact, McLuhan considers that if a medium is an extension of ourselves, thus it shapes our conception of ourselves and our conception of the world (McLuhan, p.7). In one word, a medium shapes our culture. Moreover, there is a difference between medium without content (such as electric light, McLuhan, p.8-9), and medium with content (such as writing). For the latter we ought to differentiate the medium and the content, the content being itself another medium and thus another message. For instance, McLuhan considers electric light as a medium (McLuhan, p.8-9). As an extension of our vision during night, the electric light allows us to do some activities that would not be possible otherwise, for instance working in a factory during the night. These activities are themselves the content of electric light as a medium, not its message. But in allowing activities, the electric light is a message that shapes our culture: our conception of time (especially the difference between day and night), our conception of ourselves (allowing us to do some activities during the night)…

At last, Neil Postman has developed a conception of medium as a metaphor (Postman, p.3), in the case of medium with content. Indeed, he shows that there is a close connection between the content and the form in which this content is mediated: “You cannot use smoke to do philosophy” (p.7). But, I would add, you can do a philosophy of smoke, not using smoke but a metaphorical representation of smoke. As a matter of fact, media have a metaphorical functioning: they give a representation of information, not the information itself. Thus, in Postman mind, media shape the users idea of their content. For example, he considers clock as a medium-metaphor: it carries information: time, but also, in giving a representation of time in seconds, minutes and hours, it shapes the user’s conception of time as “moment to moment” (p.11).

In a bit more than 50 years, television has taken a greater and greater importance in our lives, in terms of time (how many hours do we spend behind our TV screen), in terms of communication (the place TV has in our communication with other people), and in terms of culture (the place TV has in our access to culture). It has gone so far that some people thinks that, as Neil Postman (p.78) puts in, “television has achieved the status of a meta-medium”, that is a media that not only partly defines our knowledge, but also determines our ways of knowing, our access to the world. Therefore TV culture may not only be on TV, but also in the approach of reality, and in other media, such as books. Acknowledging such an importance leads to consider as fundamental the questions about television culture, television’s characteristics as a media, about the media itself and its influence on human culture rather than a pure content-centred approach. We will first quickly present Neil Postman theoretical assumptions about television culture, and then in this respect we will discuss whether television ruins a serious and coherent understanding of the world, or not.

First, Neil Postman gives his conception of media that is medium as a metaphor. Indeed, he considers that a specific medium presents content in a certain way, not as such but in a metaphorical way (Postman, p.3). The clock for example presents time in the form of seconds, minutes and hours (Postman, p.7). Thus a medium shapes our own representation of reality. Even if we know that seconds, minutes and hours are conventions, it is hard to conceive time without these representations. So, understanding the metaphors used by television to represent reality may indicates us how it shapes our representation of reality. This conception of media leads Postman to consider “media as epistemology” (p.16), that is to say that different media carry different conceptions of truth. For example, truth in oral societies (often in the form of proverbs) is very different from truth in literate societies (in the form of deductive logic).

This theoretical introduction is indeed very useful to know whether television is ruining a serious and coherent understanding of the world or not. Seriousness and coherence are indeed associated with writing and a written-based epistemology, writing fitting more or less with the laws of deductive (and therefore coherent) logic Aristotle has written about. So here, we will try to see how, in which form television presents reality, especially on the grounds of coherence and seriousness.

According to Postman, television is incoherent by nature. Indeed, knowing in television-based epistemology is knowledge of things, not knowledge about things (Postman, p.70).  So, in a pure television culture you may know a lot of things, but you cannot understand their implications, causes, consequences, and the context in which they take place. Indeed, television presents decontextualized information, and therefore television culture does not allow one to link two events, to think about the causes and consequences. As Postman puts in, with a bit of irony, the only link between two events we have on TV is “Now…This” (Postman, p.99). Television shows a flux of information, that is an inconstant (rather than constant), moving (rather than fixed), flowing (rather than posed), superposed (rather than linear) information. To sum up, coherence is not part of television culture. At the opposite, the richness and plurality of logic links in literate culture, maybe due to the linear format of writing, allows one to draw some coherent links between two different pieces of information.

The other point Postman emphasizes is the lack of seriousness in television, but this point needs a closer attention. Indeed, Postman does not criticize entertainment as such, but rather deplores the fact that everything that is presented on television is naturally presented in the form of entertainment (Postman, p.87). The fact that entertainment is the only way of showing things on television may be due to the audience expectations, the TV directors will or other causes. But the cause are not as important as the fact that it is the case, that even for serious topic such as a nuclear holocaust, the television does not allow reflection but emphasizes entertaining rather than seriousness through its format (Postman, pp 88-91).

We can hardly discuss Postman points about the incoherent and entertaining nature of television format, or his points about how a medium shapes our understanding of the world. Indeed, it seems rather indubitable. But we can argue whether it is better or worse than coherence and seriousness. According to Postman, television-based epistemology is definitely worse than writing-based epistemology (but being himself a book writer, we might doubt his objectivity in that matter…). I think that Postman misses a point. Indeed it does not mention that television is a mass-media and that writing has always been an elite-media, and will probably always be. A television-culture does not replace a literate culture because it does not reach the same audience. Those who are literate watch television with their literate culture and therefore have a very critical view upon it whereas those who have television culture read books with their television culture and are therefore very critical upon it. I do not think that the question whether it is good or bad is a constructive one, but to see that mass-media are based on incoherence and entertaining whereas elite-media are based on coherence and seriousness is, in my opinion far more instructive and constructive. I understand those who say that reading Kant is “boring” and “too complicated”, even if Kant is one of the most coherent and serious writers of all times. And I also understand those who say that television is incoherent and too much entertaining regarding serious topics even if a very well presented information. Neil Postman book format is itself based on this striking idea: it is a book, so rather designated (unintentionally) to a certain elite, but at the same time it is entertaining, and sometimes incoherent (the links between examples and arguments are sometimes very hard to get…). Doing that, Neil Postman undermines the idea of a medium-determinism he tries to argue for in his book. Thus, he perhaps (secretly?) argues for a “literalization” of television culture. If he does not, I would.