epistemologie (en anglais)
Knowledge is objective, and can be defined as “justified true belief based on sufficient evidence”
Thinking through philosophy needs many qualities; one among them is to define the notions correctly and very precisely. As the aims of every philosopher, truth and knowledge have to be defined in this way, philosophically. That is to say, a good philosopher must keep asking such fundamental things as truth and knowledge whatever has already been said on the topic. The philosophic field, as huge as it is, always requires an asking mind, a truth seeking goal, and an open-minded approach[1]. The philosophic field which is concerned by these wonderings is the epistemology, derived from the Greek words: episteme, i.e. knowledge, and logos, i.e. rational approach[2]. Thus we must here wonder and think about truth and knowledge with all these qualities: open mind view, accuracy, seeking willingness, and rationality.
In order to philosophy in a good way, we must wonder such things as:
What is belief?
What is Truth?
What is Knowledge?
How one’s get Knowledge?
Is the Truth objective?
Is there just one Truth?
Is truth timeless?
How can we link Truth, Knowledge and belief? We will here try to answer and explore all these interesting topics. In order to do this, let’s start with a definition of knowledge as an objective “justified true belief based on sufficient evidence” which is given by Richard E. Creel. We have to seek if this definition of knowledge is accurate, complete, and useful.
First, knowledge is defined as a belief what seems to be quite strange. Socrate, in Plato’s Gorgias[3], shows to Gorgias that to believe and to know are not the same, because there can be a false belief but only a true knowledge. F. Nietzsche, a famous philosopher of the nineteenth century, teaches us that “to believe is to refuse to know”[4] speaking especially of religious belief. Indeed to believe is to think that something is true which is totally subjective: the content of my belief may be true but it also may be false. I believe it is true but it is my subjective point of view. To believe is not to know that it is true what is objective: if I know that something is true, it is true and can not be anything else. It does not depend on my subjective mind. So, a belief seems to be the different from knowledge.
But there are several kinds of belief, not all of them fit with the notion of knowledge. There are religious beliefs (”I believe in God”), prediction beliefs (“I believe that tomorrow will be sunny”) and many others. But here what is interesting is to make a typology of beliefs according to their background, on what they are based:”I believe because… “. According to these reasons, beliefs will fit more or less with our conception of knowledge. We will work with R.E. Creel’s interesting typology of beliefs[5].
Firstly, let’s start with belief based on evidence. Is it the same thing as knowledge? Obviously not! The truth of a belief is always subjective. That is to say, a person who has a belief always thinks that his belief is true; it is the definition of belief. But this subjectivity also works with the evidence which justifies the belief. Whatever the evidence, it can be interpreted in many ways, some interpretations can be true but some else can be false, depending on the subjective criteria you take to determine its relevance. For instance, if I believe that Tony Blair is going to be elected in the next British elections because he is a good politician and he is effectively elected, the fact that he has been elected does not prove the evidence <he is a good politician> made him win. Thus my belief upon Tony Blair victory was not knowledge, because it is based on subjective evidences and it could have been different. To sum up, a belief based on evidence can not constitute knowledge because it is always subjective and moreover the truth of a belief can not be established objectively.
Then, if a belief based on evidence is true, is it knowledge? We have to answer that it is not the case, just for the same reasons. It is still too much subjective. As we have already said, your belief based on evidence can be true but it also can be false. The truth of knowledge is not a probability: it is true! There are two beliefs upon the election or the defeat of Tony Blair; one may be true and the other not. But it is impossible to determine which one is true yet, because we don’t have any rational proof of the outcome of an election. The two statements are just speculation. And as such, even if one is true, it can definitely not constitute knowledge.
Further then, can a justified belief constitute knowledge? A justified belief is a belief that you can justify rationally. Does it mean that it is knowledge? Or in another way, can a justified belief be false? Let us see it together. For instance, if I believe that life can not exist on other planets because the probability of the chemical creation of DNA is too small, one’s can believe that universe is huge enough for another creation of DNA on an other planet. The two beliefs are both based on rational justification but only one can be true. So a justified belief can be false and as such does not constitute knowledge.
Finally, we can define knowledge like Creel does: knowledge is a “justified true belief based on sufficient evidence”[6]. From a true belief totally subjective, we arrive to objective knowledge, in justifying rationally the truth of our belief and in proving by sufficient evidence that the belief is true. It is the so called “justification theory of knowledge”: in order to have knowledge, you must think that your belief is true, that belief must be true and you have to understand how some reasons prove that your belief is true. But what is maybe the most important element is this definition is the notion of truth. What is truth? What makes a belief to be true?
In the common sense, truth is naturally objective (that is to say that it is not depending on who is telling the truth), single (that is to say that there is only one truth) and timeless (that is to say that a true statement is always true). In one word truth is transcendent. There are several philosophical positions regarding the concept of truth, mainly three. Not all of them fit with this common sense transcendent conception of truth.
Firstly, the correspondence theory of truth is the most widely held conception of truth, perhaps because it fits to the common sense on truth. According to this theory, a statement is true if what it says corresponds to the reality. For instance, if I am saying that it is raining and it is effectively raining outside, my belief is true. And if I’m saying that it is sunny and it is raining outside thus my statement is false. This conception fits with the common sense because reality is objective: reality exist independently from the subjective perception we can have of it. Reality is also single: there is just one reality so there is only one truth; things are in one way and as such can not be in another way. And at least reality is timeless because reality at time T can not be changed at time T+1. So a true statement upon the reality at time T may be false at time i+1, but it will always be true for time T.
The main criticisms we can do to this theory are brought by the supporters of another conception of truth: Truth depends on the reality, but how can we know how reality is? Do we know it with our sensible perception? What about hallucinations? Indeed the weakest point of the correspondence theory of truth is the perception of reality. We can not be sure that what we see, what we hear, what we touch, what we smell and what we taste, is reality. From a sceptic point of view, knowledge is impossible because we can not know how reality is and thus neither what truth is.
This other theory of knowledge, the coherence theory, avoids this confrontation with reality. In fact, according to this theory truth has nothing to do with reality. A belief is true when it coheres with others former beliefs that are considered true. For example, if I believe that the sun turns around the earth, it is true because it coheres with the religious idea that Earth is the centre of the universe. Nowadays we know that universe has no centre and that Earth turns around the sun in reality, so my statement is not true according to the correspondence theory. But it can be true according to the coherence theory. The coherence truth is disconnected from reality. It just has to cohere with my mainstream ideas and beliefs. Here truth is not objective because it coheres with subjective beliefs. Let’s say that it is an inter-subjective definition of truth. It is not single because there may be several main beliefs at the same time, and neither timeless because main beliefs can change with time. In one word, this conception of truth is immanent.
The pragmatic theory of truth is not as disconnected from the reality sa the coherence theory. According to this theory, a belief is true if it works or if it is useful in our real life. Here the connection with reality is made a posteriori. That is to say that the truth of a belief can be established in testing successfully this belief with an experience. The best example of this conception of truth is given by Creel[7]: a placebo makes physically no effect, but sometimes it can treat an illness only in making the patient to think taking a medicine. Thus according to the pragmatist theory a placebo is medicine because it works treating illnesses. According to the correspondence theory of truth, it is not the case because a placebo has no “real” or physical effect treating the illness of the patient.
The most plausible theory of truth is of course the correspondence theory of truth because it fits with a transcendental conception of truth, that is to say objective, single and timeless. Most of human beings trust their senses in order to know how reality is. But as René Descartes has developed in his “Discours de la méthode”[8], our senses can be misleading. That is to say that if we apply the sceptical doubt as a method in order to determine what is knowledge and what is not, we will conclude that we can know nothing of reality through our senses perception. The best proof of the weakness of the utilisation of our senses to know the reality is that there is indeed no sensible difference between hallucination and a “real” perception.
Thus the correspondence theory of truth has to be completed with the two others in order to make sure of the truth of a belief. First, we have to begin with the correspondence theory: a true statement must correspond to the reality. Then, it must cohere with other anterior true beliefs. We can call this stage the confrontation of my belief with other belief. And finally, it must work if we experience it. This method looks like the scientific “hypothesis-argumentation-experimentation” method. So a true statement must fit with the reality, with other true beliefs, and must work a posteriori.
With this method we can suppose that we have the most objective truth as far as it is possible. Indeed, objectivity is something hard to reach. Objectivity means that something exists as such, as an object. An objective knowledge means that this knowledge is not subjective that is to say independent from the subject (the person) who knows. We have seen that knowledge as such must be objective. How can we reach this needed objectivity? Can we?
Taking into account our definition of truth, it follows that seeking of truth and objectivity is a process. L.M. de Rijk[9] has shown that facts are very far from reality. People often think that a fact is reality. Indeed, L.M. de Rijk shows that reality is a physical thing, an event is another thing but still physical, the influence of an event creating a thought process is also another thing, and finally fact is the content of this thought process. So fact is a “mental entity” and looks like anything but totally objective. We can do almost the same analysis for the truth: reality is an objective thing, the fact that I think to the reality is another thing. Then the content of my thought is still another thing, a mental entity. And the truth or falsity property of this content is also another thing, still mental and as such far from reality and its objectivity. So knowledge as such cannot be totally objective. But L.M. de Rijk suggests that instead of objectivity which is impossible to reach, we should seek “objectivation”, that is to say to seek the most objectivity one’s can. How our method to establish the truth of a belief can help us in this way?
First, reality as such is objective. But, as we have already seen, our perception of reality trough our senses can be misleading. Each of us has a different perception of reality so the observation of reality alone can not lead to an objective knowledge of this reality. Then we have to confront our belief with other former beliefs or belief of other human beings. This confrontation may lead to an agreement between several subjective beliefs trough argumentation. This agreement is inter-subjective which is of course more objective than a subjective belief. At last experience as a return to reality gives us further more objectivity. So objectivity as such is impossible to reach but we can “objectivate” knowledge with the “observation-confrontation-experimentation” method. To sum up truth of knowledge is a good way to objectivate knowledge.
For instance, if I look at the water when a washbasin is draining, I can observe that the water turn clockwise. I believe that it is always the case. This is a subjective belief. Seeking if it is true, I confront my belief with some of other inhabitants of the north hemisphere. My belief that water always turns clockwise is confirmed and it becomes inter subjective. Then if I confront my belief with some inhabitants of the south hemisphere, they will tell me that water always turns counter-clockwise. So we discuss and arrive to a further more inter-subjective agreement: water always turns clockwise in the north hemisphere and counter-clockwise in the south hemisphere. At last if I test this belief in reality, the experience will confirm the truth of my belief, and objectivate it. From a subjective false belief, I went to an “objectivated” true belief, through observation, confrontation and experience.
We have already seen that knowledge has to be an objectivated justified true belief. Is our definition of knowledge complete now? Not yet. Knowledge has to be confirmed by sufficient evidence. As we have already seen, evidences can be interpreted in many ways not all of them are accurate, and are subjective. For instance, the evidence <every social group has its religion> can be interpreted in many ways. For an atheistic person, this evidence will show that every social group needs a religion to regulate its social relationships and to give an explanation for unexplained phenomenon. For a believer, it would be the evidence of God existence. Evidence can lead to two very different subjective beliefs. In fact this evidence does not prove anything. Evidence has to be sufficient in order to lead to knowledge, that is to say that it can not be interpreted in several ways and as such it prove the truth of a belief. For example, if my phone rings, that proves that someone is calling me. The evidence <my phone rings> can only be interpreted in one way: it leads to the (true) belief that someone is calling me. Following is that it is really hard to have sufficient evidence for some phenomenon more complicated than a phone call, like the existence or non existence of God. In these cases, knowledge can not be reached. We can only know that we doubt about it.
To conclude, we can have a more dynamic definition of knowledge. We define knowledge as the process of objectivation of a subjective “justified true belief based on sufficient evidence”. Each characteristic of this definition leads to more objectivity of the belief. Justification brings the objectivity of rationalism. Truth, as an already objectivated element through the seeking method” observation-confrontation-experimentation” brings furthermore objectivity. At last, sufficient evidence leads directly to objective knowledge because it can only be interpreted in one way. Following is that every philosopher does not seek Truth in itself but tries to objectivate his own subjective belief, more or less successfully. This is why justification, observation, discussion, experience and evidences are so important in philosophy. Thus Philosophy can be considered as a process too. “Philosophising” as a seeking truth and knowledge process seems more appropriated than philosophy as a discipline.
Moreover this definition of philosophising as the objectivation of the philosopher subjective beliefs puts the philosopher in a central place. Ideas, theories, beliefs do not exist on their own. Nietzsche says in the preface of the gay science[10] that a philosophy is the autobiography of a philosopher and has written his own autobiography in Ecce Homo[11]. Thus the study of a philosopher’s text should be linked with the study of this philosopher’s life. For example, the fact that Plato has been dramatist and a great wrestler when he was young can explain the fact that in his famous dialogues, there is some staging where all Socrates’ adversaries are knocked out by his arguments. Furthermore, this dynamic definition of knowledge leads us to the fundamental question of its transmission. As an objectivated belief, can knowledge be transmitted without lose of objectivity. Do we have to re-objectivate all knowledge we are taught?
Sources:
[1] Richard E. Creel, thinking philosophically, an introduction to critical reflection and rational dialogue, blackwell publishers, 2001, p. 69 -74
[2] Chris Horner and Emrys Westacott, thinking through philosophy,
[3] Plato, Gorgias and the rhetoric
[4] Nietzsche, the antichrist, 1888
[5] Richard E. Creel, thinking philosophically, an introduction to critical reflection and rational dialogue, blackwell publishers, 2001, p. 104-109
[6] Richard E. Creel, thinking philosophically, an introduction to critical reflection and rational dialogue, blackwell publishers, 2001, p.108
[7] Richard E. Creel, thinking philosophically, an introduction to critical reflection and rational dialogue, blackwell publishers, 2001, p.97
[8] René Descartes, le discours de la méthode, 1637
[9] L. M. de Rijk, facts and events: the Historian’s task, Vivarium XVII,I, 1979
[10] Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 1882